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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
V . 
AARON TOMAS HERRERA, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
CaseNo.20010175-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996), whereby the defendant in a district court criminal action may take 
an appeal to the Court of Appeals from a final order for anything other than a first degree 
or capital felony offense. Appellant/Defendant Aaron Tomas Herrera was convicted of 
robbery, a second degree felony offense in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 
(1999), with enhancements; and possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, 
a second degree felony offense in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503(3)(a) (1999). 
A copy of the judgment is attached hereto as Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issue presented for review is as follows: 
A trial court abuses its discretion if it imposes consecutive sentences in a case 
without considering certain relevant statutory factors, including the gravity and circum-
stances of the offenses and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
defendant. In imposing consecutive sentences, the record of the trial court proceedings in 
this case fails to support that the trial court considered the relevant factors. In that regard, 
the issue on appeal is as follows: Whether the consecutive sentences can be sustained 
where the record is silent as to whether the trial court considered the factors as required 
by statute; also, whether consideration of the facts in this case in light of the statutory 
factors supports concurrent sentencing. 
Standard of Review: The trial court's sentencing order is subject to review for an 
abuse of discretion, State v. Houk. 906 P.2d 907, 909 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), which occurs 
if the trial court fails to consider legally relevant statutory factors. State v. McCovey, 803 
P.2d 1234,1235 (Utah 1990). Also, this Court will not assume that the trial court con-
sidered relevant statutory factors if an ambiguity in the facts makes such an assumption 
unreasonable, or if a prior case or statutory law requires the trial court to make findings in 
order that this Court may properly perform its appellate review function. See State v. 
Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1234 (Utah 1997) (citing State v. Labrum. 925 P.2d 937, 939-
40 (Utah 1996); State v. Nelson, 725 P.2d 1353, 1355-36 n. 3 (Utah 1986)). 
PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT 
The issue on appeal may be reviewed under the plain error doctrine. State v. 
Palmer, 860 P.2d 339, 342 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied. 868 P.2d 95 (Utah 1993); 
Labrum, 925 P.2d at 940-41. In addition, this Court may consider the issue under Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure 22(e) (2001). See State v. Brooks. 908 P.2d 856, 860 (Utah 
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1995) (under Rule 22(e) appellate court may decide for the first time on appeal whether 
sentence was imposed in an illegal manner, even if the issue was not raised below). 
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following provisions will be determinative of the issue on appeal in this case: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (1999); Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e) (2001). A copy of those 
provisions is attached hereto as Addendum B. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, Disposition in the Court Below. 
On November 17, 1999, the state initiated criminal charges against Herrera (R. 3-
5), which were amended as follows: Herrera was charged by amended information with 
robbery, a second degree felony offense in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 with 
enhancements, and possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, a second 
degree felony offense in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503(l)(a)(i). (R. 43-44.) 
On November 16, 2000, Herrera entered into a guilty plea to the offenses as 
charged in the amended information: robbery with gun and gang enhancements, and 
possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person. (R. 50-57.) On January 5, 
2001, the trial court sentenced Herrera to serve an indeterminate prison term of six to 
fifteen years for robbery with gang enhancement, plus one to five years for the firearm 
enhancement, and an indeterminate prison term of one to fifteen years for possession of a 
3 
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m 
gun by a restricted person. (R. 59-61.)1 The judge ordered all terms to run consecutively. 
(R. 60-61.) Herrera is appealing from the judgment of conviction. He maintains the * 
sentencing judge abused her discretion when she ordered Herrera to serve consecutive 
prison terms for the offenses without consideration of the relevant statutory factors. j 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On November 14,1999, at approximately 2:00 in the morning, Keith Garcia was 
4 
driving home from work (R. 79:6) in a 1999 Honda Civic that he had purchased earlier in 
the week (R. 79:11), when three individuals waved him down and approached the car, 
"one on the driver side of my car, two on the passenger side." (R. 79:7.) One of the 
individuals ordered Garcia to open the driver side door and pointed a gun through the 
window; Garcia complied and when the door was opened, the gunman put the weapon to I 
Garcia's head, while a second person stuck a knife to Garcia's side. (R. 79:7-9; 79:21-
23.) The gunman asked Garcia if he wanted to die and ordered Garcia to get out of the car 
and to give up possession of it. (Presentence Investigation Report at 15; R. 79:9; 79:23.) 
1 The judgment in this case ordered Herrera to serve six-to-fifteen years on the "robbery 
with the gun enhancement," one-to-fifteen years for "possession of a dangerous weapon 
with group enhancement," and "1-5 years." (R. 61.) That is incorrect. Herrera pleaded 
guilty to the crimes of robbery with gun and gang enhancements, and possession of a dan-
gerous weapon by a restricted person. (R. 50; see also 43-44 (state charged robbery with 
gun and gang enhancements, and possession by a restricted person); 80:15-16 (pro-
secutor requested sentence for offenses as charged and pursuant to plea).) Consequently, 
the judgment should be as follows: for the robbery charge, six-to-fifteen years under the 
gang enhancement statute (see Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.l(3)(d) and (5) (1999)), plus 
one-to-five years for the gun enhancement (Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 (1999)); and for 
the possession charge, one-to-fifteen years (Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 (1999)). 
4 
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During the preliminary hearing Garcia identified the gunman as Herrera. (R. 79:8.) 
As Garcia started to get out of the car, the man with the knife said "never mind, 
and they pushed [him] back in." (R. 79:9.) After Garcia was pushed into the driver's 
seat, Herrera got into the car behind Garcia, and the other two individuals got into the car 
on the passenger's side, one in the back and one in the front. (R. 79:9-10.) Thereafter, 
Garcia did not see the gun or the knife; "there was no gun, no knife being held to [him], 
or against [him] or anything" from that point on. (R. 79:29, 31.) 
Garcia testified that he wanted to stay with the car and suspects (R. 79:25), and 
that he agreed to take the suspects wherever they wanted to go. (R. 79:24.) 
After Garcia drove the car a short distance, he told the men he wanted to get out. 
(R. 79:10; 79:26.) Herrera said "fine," and Garcia got out of the car and closed the door. 
(R. 79:11-12.) Herrera told Garcia he would return the car later, and he left with the other 
individuals. (R. 79:12.) Garcia ran home and called the police. (R. 79:12.) 
Officers responding to the call spotted the car in a residential area in West Jordan 
and began pursuit. (R. 79:35.) The chase reached speeds of 85 miles per hour (R. 79:35-
36) and continued along various streets onto a resident's lawn through a chain link fence 
(R. 79:38) and back onto the streets. 
In order to bring an end to the chase, an officer engaged in a "pursuit intervention 
technique" that involved pulling up to the suspect vehicle, matching speeds, then touching 
the back tire on the suspect vehicle with the front tire of the officer's car. (R. 79:39-40.) 
5 
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,f[W]hat that does is pushes the suspect vehicle sideways and you let off the gas and the 
vehicle will spin around" so that officers can position their cars in such a way so as to box 
the suspect vehicle in. (R. 79:40.) 
In this case, the maneuver caused the suspect vehicle to jump a curb, pop the tires, 
and flip over against a tree in the front yard of a residence. (R. 79:39-40-41.) The 
suspects got out of the car and were arrested. (R. 79:41-42.) Officers recovered 
Herrera's gun from the vehicle and discovered it was empty; no casings or bullets were 
found with the gun. (R. 79:42; 79:53-54.) In addition, the arresting officer testified that 
when he interviewed Herrera he could smell alcohol on his breath, and it was his 
impression that Herrera was "tweaking," or "high on meth." (R. 79: 52, 55.) 
As set forth above (Statement of the Case), Herrera was charged and pleaded 
guilty to two offenses. He was sentenced to serve consecutive sentences for the crimes. 
The trial court's order is attached as Addendum C. Additional facts are set forth below. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Under Utah law, if a sentencing judge imposes consecutive sentences in a case, the 
judge is required to consider the facts in light of specific statutory factors. Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-401 (1999). The judge is required to consider the gravity and circumstances 
of the offenses, and the defendant's history, character, and rehabilitative needs. 
In this case, the sentencing judge imposed consecutive sentences. In doing so, the 
judge failed to consider the facts in light of the relevant statutory factors. The sentencing 
6 
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judge's failure to consider the factors and to make specific findings on the record in 
connection therewith constitutes error. 
Herrera respectfully requests that this Court vacate the sentences in this case and 
remand the matter for further proceedings consistent with Section 76-3-401. The trial 
judge should be directed on remand to consider the facts of record in light of the statutory 
factors. To that end, the trial judge should consider whether concurrent sentencing is 
proper in this case in light of the factors. 
ARGUMENT 
SECTION 76-3-401 REQUIRES THE TRIAL JUDGE TO CONSIDER 
SPECIFIC FACTORS IN ORDERING A DEFENDANT TO SERVE 
CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES. 
The trial court in this matter committed plain error when it ordered Herrera to 
serve consecutive prison terms without making findings on the record in light of relevant 
statutory factors. To establish plain error, an appellant must show that "(i) [a]n error 
exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is 
harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
outcome for the appellant, or phrased differently, our confidence in the verdict is 
undermined." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993). As further set forth 
herein, an obvious error exists in this case. 
In addition, this Court may decide the issue on appeal in this matter under Rule 
22(e), Utah R. Crim. P. Rule 22(e) provides that ff[t]he court may correct an illegal 
7 
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sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any time." Utah R. Crim. P. 
22(e) (2001). The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that an appellate court may consider 
whether a sentence has been imposed in an illegal manner under Rule 22(e), even if the 
issue has been raised for the first time on appeal. Brooks. 908 P.2d at 860. In this case, 
as set forth herein, the trial court imposed consecutive sentences in an illegal manner. 
Specifically, according to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(1) (1999) a trial court may 
order a defendant to serve concurrent or consecutive sentences when the defendant is 
convicted of more than one offense in a case. Concurrent sentencing is favored. Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-3-401(1) (1999); State v. StrunL 846 P.2d 1297,1301 (Utah 1993). 
Pursuant to the statute, before a trial judge may impose consecutive sentences, the judge 
"shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses and the history, character, 
and rehabilitative needs of the defendant." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(4). The statute 
mandates consideration of the specific factors. 
Although Section 76-3-401(4) does not specify whether a trial court must make 
explicit findings on the record concerning the statutory factors, Utah case law supports 
such a determination. Consider State v. StrunL 846 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1993), and State v. 
Smitil, 909 P.2d 236 (Utah 1995). 
In StrunL 846 P.2d 1297, defendant, who was sixteen at the time of the crime, 
pleaded guilty to homicide, child kidnaping and aggravated sexual abuse of a child. IdL at 
1299. The trial judge sentenced Strunk to life imprisonment for the homicide and 
8 
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minimum mandatory terms of 15 to life and 9 years to life on the other two counts 
respectively. Id The judge ordered consecutive sentencing. See id. at 1301. 
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court considered whether the consecutive sentences 
were proper under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401. Id. at 1301. While the supreme court re-
cognized that the gravity and circumstances of the crime — "[t]he senseless kidnaping, 
sexual assault, and killing of a young child in a cruel and depraved manner" — warranted 
"severe sentences," id. at 1301, it ruled that the record failed to support proper 
compliance with the statute. The trial court failed to give adequate consideration to the 
statutory factors, specifically, the "rehabilitative needs of the defendant." Id. at 1302. In 
that regard, the trial court's reliance on a diagnostic report apparently did not serve to 
satisfy the statutory requirements. Id. 1301-02. 
The supreme court in Strunk determined that "the trial court abused its discretion 
in failing to sufficiently consider defendant's rehabilitative needs in light of his extreme 
youth and absence of prior violent crimes." Id. at 1302. The court vacated Strunk's 
sentences and remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing. 
In Smith. 909 P.2d 236, defendant abducted a six-year-old girl at knife point, 
forced her into a car and drove to another location, then raped and sodomized her. The 
girl was bleeding from her injuries when she was discovered about an hour later. Li at 
238-39. The trial court found that the victim suffered substantial bodily injuries and it 
found additional aggravating factors, including: (1) the "victim's vulnerability due to 
9 
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young age," (2) the defendant's "commission of multiple crimes," (3) his "use of a knife," 
and (4) defendant's prior history of child sex abuse. The trial judge sentenced Smith to 
four consecutive minimum mandatory terms of fifteen years to life. Id at 244. 
While the sentencing judge in that matter considered "defendant's history, 
character, and rehabilitation possibilities," id. at 244, the Utah Supreme Court overturned 
the consecutive sentencing, reasoning that the four consecutive minimum mandatory 
sentences of fifteen years to life essentially created a minimum mandatory life sentence. 
Id. at 244-45. Such a sentence precluded the Board of Pardons from exercising 
"discretion to take into account defendant's future conduct and possible progress toward 
rehabilitation." Id at 245. Although the court explicitly limited Smith to its facts, id., 
that case provides guidance in determining whether a trial court has abused its discretion 
in ordering consecutive sentences. 
In accordance with Smith and Strunk, a trial court must carefully consider and 
analyze the available facts in light of the statutory factors before ordering consecutive 
sentences in a case. In that regard, and for purposes of appeal, the only practical way an 
appellate court may be able to determine whether the trial court has complied with case 
law and § 76-3-401(4) in imposing consecutive sentences is to require the trial court to 
enter specific findings on the record concerning the facts in light of the statutory factors. 
According to Utah law, findings are required on the record when "an ambiguity of 
the facts" makes it unreasonable to assume compliance with the law, or when a prior case 
10 
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states that findings on a particular issue must be made "to impress upon the trial court the 
importance of the issue so as to ensure that we can properly perform our appellate review 
function." Robertson. 932 P.2d at 1234 (citing Labrum. 925 P.2d at 939-40; Nelson. 735 
P.2d at 1355-56 n.3): see State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774, 788 n.6 (Utah 1991) (if trial 
court fails to enter findings, appellate court will uphold trial court ruling if it would be 
reasonable to assume that trial court actually made findings); State v. Hodges. 798 P.2d 
270,274 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (findings on the record enable reviewing court to accu-
rately determine the basis for the trial court decision and to assess compliance with law); 
Nelson. 725 P.2d at 1355-56 n.3 (where statute required trial court to consider factors, 
Utah Supreme Court required trial court to enter findings on the record to ensure com-
pliance with statutory factors); State in the Interest of Clatterbuck. 700 P.2d 1076, 1081 
(Utah 1985) (same); State v. Galli. 967 P.2d 930,938 (Utah 1998) (statute required trial 
court to consider factors; supreme court refused to assume compliance where trial court 
failed to give weight to information in the record in light of statutory considerations). 
Under the law, record findings are necessary to ensure that a trial court has 
complied with the statute in exercising discretion at sentencing. Also, record findings 
facilitate review, while a lack of findings interferes with this Court's appellate review 
function. Robertson. 932 P.2d at 1234; see Rucker v. Dalton. 598 P.2d 1336, 1339 (Utah 
1979) (a lack of explicit findings on the record serves to seriously undermine "the 
reviewing function of this Court"). 
11 
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Indeed, strong policy considerations support explicit findings on the record in light 
of the statutory factors. Findings ensure well-reasoned sentencing decisions that comply * 
with statutory mandates; findings eliminate speculation over whether a sentencing judge 
actually considered and weighed the relevant factors in sentencing, or determined to g 
penalize defendant for ambiguous reasons; and explicit findings in light of statutory 
factors serve to reduce appellate challenges to sentencing decisions. In sum, findings 
ensure that the trial judge complied with the statute in sentencing. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ENTER FINDINGS IN LIGHT OF THE 
STATUTORY FACTORS. 
I 
In this case, during sentencing proceedings the trial court ordered Herrera to serve 
consecutive sentences for second-degree robbery with enhancements, and second-degree 
possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person. (R. 80:22-23); see supra note 
1, herein. While the offenses were serious, Strunk. 846 P.2d at 1301, the facts bearing on 
the court's consecutive sentencing order were ambiguous. In addition, the trial court 
failed to enter findings relating to the basis for its decision in light of the statutory factors. 
Specifically, the record contains facts concerning the circumstances of the charged 
offenses and Herrera's rehabilitative needs. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(4) (court must 
consider such facts). Those facts support concurrent sentencing. (See R. 80; infra point 
B, herein.) With regard to the circumstances of the offenses, the crimes for robbery and 
possession arose from the same conduct, where Herrera, a restricted person, possessed a 
12 
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gun during the robbery. (R. 50-57.) The gun was empty and no one was injured. (See R. 
79:53-54.) While those facts support two convictions, they do not support consecutive 
sentencing. (See infra point B. 1.) Indeed, it is unclear from the record whether the judge 
considered those circumstances in ordering consecutive sentences in this case. 
The statute requires the trial court to consider the circumstances of the offense 
before imposing consecutive sentences. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(4). Without 
findings on the record, there is no way to determine whether the judge properly 
considered relevant facts in light of the statutory factors to reach the consecutive 
sentencing decision. See Rucker, 598 P.2d at 1338 (record was unclear in light of facts as 
to why judge determined the matter as he did, requiring remand for further findings). 
Given the ambiguity in the record, explicit findings on the record were necessary. 
Robertson. 932 P.2d at 1234 (findings are necessary where facts are ambiguous). Failure 
to consider the facts in light of the factors, and failure to note on the record the basis for 
consecutive sentencing constituted obvious error in this case. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-
3-401(4) (court "shall" consider factors); see also State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, f51, 
992 P.2d 951 (where the law is plainly set forth, the trial court's failure to recognize 
defects in the proceedings constitutes obvious error). 
With regard to Herrera's rehabilitative needs, while the trial judge here had access 
to the presentence investigation report —which described Herrera's past crimes, family 
background and general history, as well as the facts relating to the offenses at issue and 
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the victim's impact statement - that is not enough to support compliance with the statute. 
The report contained information concerning Herrera's rehabilitative needs that supported 
concurrent sentencing. (See infra point B.2.) Yet, the record fails to support whether the 
trial judge gave those facts proper weight in light of the statutory factors. See Strunk. 846 
P.2d at 1301-02 (reliance on report was insufficient; trial court was required to consider 
defendant's rehabilitative needs) Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(4); Robertson. 932 P.2d at 
1234; Rucker. 598 P.2d at 1338 (trial court failed to enter findings as to why it considered 
some facts but not others; inconsistencies in the matter required remand). 
It would be unreasonable to assume compliance with the statute where the judge 
made no reference to facts contained in the report concerning Herrera's rehabilitative 
needs, and she made no findings on the matter. Indeed, the record fails to support that the 
judge considered Herrera's rehabilitative needs in ordering consecutive sentences. R. 80. 
Explicit findings of fact were required on the record in this case in light of the 
statutory factors. As further set forth below, consideration of the facts in light of the 
statutory factors supports the determination that the trial court abused its discretion in 
ordering consecutive sentences on the second degree felony offenses. Galli. 967 P.2d at 
938. Herrera respectfully requests that this Court vacate the consecutive sentences and 
remand the case to the trial court for proper consideration of the facts in light of the 
statutory factors. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(4); Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e) (2001) 
(sentence imposed in illegal manner may be corrected at any time). 
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B. PROPER CONSIDERATION OF THE FACTS SUPPORTS CONCURRENT 
SENTENCING. 
1. The Trial Court Was Required to Consider the Gravity and Circumstances of 
the Offenses. 
With respect to the first statutory factor that the trial court must consider - "the 
gravity and circumstances of the offenses" — the robbery and possession crimes here were 
both second degree felony offenses and each carried a prison term of one to fifteen years. 
The enhancements on the robbery offense increased the prison term on that crime to 
seven-to-twenty years. (R. 59-61); see supra note 1, herein. In the context of this case, 
the gravity of the crimes is reflected in the nature of the charges with enhancements. That 
is, Herrera has been adequately punished in this matter for the use of a firearm where he 
was charged and convicted of two second-degree felony offenses: robbery with enhance-
ments, and possession. Without more, those facts do not support consecutive sentences. 
In addition, the second degree felony offenses in this case with enhancements 
arose from the same criminal act. Stated another way, Herrera's use of a gun in the 
commission of the crime resulted in two separate second-degree felony offenses with 
enhancements. According to the Utah Sentence and Release Guidelines, Appendix D, 
Form 4, the fact that the "offenses were from a single criminal act" is a mitigating 
circumstance. See also Smith, 909 P.2d at 245 (although defendant was convicted of four 
crimes, "it is appropriate to observe that all of them arose out of one criminal episode" to 
support concurrent sentencing). The crimes at issue support concurrent sentencing. 
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In considering the circumstances surrounding the offenses, the facts reflect that 
Herrera made threatening comments to and pointed a gun at Garcia in order to take his 
car. (R. 79:8-9,23.) The gun was empty. (R. 79:42; 79:53-54.) Once the suspects were 
inside Garcia's car, they no longer threatened Garcia with weapons. Garcia testified there 
was "no gun, no knife being held to [him], or against [him] or anything." (R. 79:29,31.) 
He also testified that he chose to stay with the suspects and car; he did not want to leave. 
(R. 79:25.) After Garcia drove the car a short distance with the suspects, he expressed 
that he wanted out of the car. Herrera said, "fine," and Garcia got out. (R. 79:10-12; 
79:26.) Herrera told Garcia he would return with the car later, and he left. (R. 79:12.) 
While the offenses here were grave and not to be condoned, the crimes did not 
amount to the extreme circumstances found in Strunk or Smith. The facts reflect that it 
was never Herrera9s intent to hurt anyone (the gun was empty). The crimes did not result 
in physical harm; and Herrera intended to return the car to Garcia. See GalH, 967 P.2d at 
938 (trial courts abused discretion in ordering consecutive sentences; according to the 
facts, defendant engaged in three separate aggravated robberies with gun). Also, after 
Herrera was charged, he entered a voluntary plea to the offenses. (R. 50-57.) 
Herrera9 s decision to take responsibility for the crimes allowed Garcia to move on 
with his life and it brought resolution to the case. Because Herrera cooperated in the 
matter, the state was able to bring it to a conclusion sooner rather than later. The court 
should have weighed those circumstances favorably in considering the sentences in this 
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case. See Galli. 967 P.2d at 938 (defendant voluntarily confessed and admitted 
responsibility for the crimes he committed, thereby supporting concurrent sentencing). 
It is unclear from the record how the trial judge considered the facts and 
circumstances of the offenses in light of the statutory factors. While the facts support the 
convictions for second degree felony offenses and enhancements, the circumstances here 
were not particularly heinous. See Strunk, 846 P.2d at 1301 (although defendant 
kidnaped, assaulted and murdered victim, court reversed consecutive sentences); Smith, 
909 P.2d at 236 (although defendant kidnaped, raped and sodomized 6-year old victim, 
court reversed consecutive sentences); see also State v. Pierson. 2000 UT App 274, fflfl-
5,22-23, 12 P.3d 103 (defendant — who was convicted of aggravated burglary, aggra-
vated kidnaping, and murder - fired gun during commission of offenses and lacked re-
morse; also, one person was killed during crimes). Further, the trial judge failed to give 
proper consideration to Herrera's acceptance of responsibility for the crimes in pleading 
guilty and his remorse for the distress he caused the victim. (See R. 80); GaUi, 967 P.2d 
at 938 (defendant admitted responsibility for crimes, supporting concurrent sentencing). 
The facts here do not support consecutive sentencing. Rather, they support con-
current sentencing. There is no basis to determine whether the trial court complied with 
the statute since it failed to make findings in the record relating to the factors. The lack of 
findings constitutes error. See Robertson. 932 P.2d at 1234 (court will not assume 
compliance with statute where facts are ambiguous); Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(4) 
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(court must consider factors before ordering consecutive sentencing). 
2. The Trial Court Was Required to Consider Defendant's History. Character, and 
Rehabilitative Needs. 
With respect to the remaining factors - Herrera's history and character, and his 
rehabilitative needs (§ 76-3-401(4)) — the facts reflect that Herrera had been convicted of 
and served prison sentences for prior offenses, he suffered a long-term substance abuse 
problem, he was subjected to abuse as a child, and he was remorseful. (See R. 80.) 
In considering Herrera5 s criminal history, those facts do not support the imposition 
of consecutive sentences in this matter. Indeed, in the context of this case, Herrera9 s cri-
minal history has already been taken into consideration where he was charged and con-
victed in this matter of a separate, second-degree-felony offense as a result of that history: 
possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person. 
That is, where Herrera is already required to pay for his criminal past with the 
additional felony conviction in this case (possession by a restricted person), he should not 
be further penalized with the imposition of consecutive sentences. There is nothing 
extraordinary about Herrera's criminal past to warrant the separate second degree felony 
convictions here together with the consecutive sentencing on the matter. 
In addition, the facts reflect that Herrera accepted responsibility for his criminal 
past in that he entered guilty pleas and was sentenced to prison for the earlier crimes. 
(Presentence Investigation Report at 7-8.) Herrera served his time on those offenses. 
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(See R. 80:3-6.) In that regard, Herrera's current prison term is already a consecutive 
sentence where he was previously incarcerated for the offenses that served as the basis for 
the possession offense here. 
In sum, while the facts of record reflect a criminal history, they also reflect that 
Herrera has been punished by serving time on the those offenses, and he continues to be 
punished with an additional second-degree-felony offense on his record in this case 
(possession by a restricted person). Also, Herrera demonstrated a willingness to take 
responsibility for his past conduct in pleading guilty and serving his past sentences. See 
Galll 967 P.2d at 938 (defendant admitted responsibility for the crimes). Those facts 
support concurrent sentencing here. 
Next, according to additional facts contained in the record, Herrera was abandoned 
by his father when he was four, kidnaped by his father during visitations, physically 
abused by his mother, and a witness to his father's physical abuse toward his mother. (R. 
80:8-9; Presentence Investigation Report at 9.) Herrera's father was a negative influence 
on his life, where his father introduced him to drugs and alcohol at a young age. (R. 79:8-
9.) Herrera's dysfunctional family and upbringing should have been "a mitigating factor" 
in the matter, see Smith, 909 P.2d at 244 (trial court determined that defendant's 
victimization as a child was a mitigating factor), supporting concurrent sentencing. 
Also, Herrera continues to have a substance abuse problem. (R. 79:52, 55 (Herrera 
was drunk and high during commission of crimes here); Presentence Investigation Report 
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at 9,11.) Indeed, the author of the presentence report considered substance abuse 
intervention and rehabilitation to be necessary to Herrera. "It is hoped while imprisoned 
and on parole status, the defendant will begin to address his lengthy substance abuse 
history, and dysfunctional childhood because until he does he will remain a danger to the 
community." (Presentence Investigation Report at 15.) 
The supreme court in Smith and Strunk considered defendants' rehabilitative needs 
to be the most important consideration in imposing consecutive sentences. Smith, 909 
P.2d at 245; Strunk. 846 P.2d at 1302. In addition, the statute requires the trial court to 
consider a defendant's rehabilitative needs in the matter. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(4). 
Here, the trial court did not give that factor any consideration. Indeed, the trial court 
failed to make any reference on the record to Herrera's rehabilitative needs. (See R. 80); 
see Hodges, 798 P.2d at 273-74 (record must be sufficient to support compliance with 
statute; while record indicted trial court received letters concerning defendant's probation, 
it failed to reveal "how much, if at all, the court relied" on those letters in its decision). 
Since the record fails to support that the trial court gave any consideration to 
Herrera's rehabilitative needs in ordering consecutive sentences, there is no basis for 
assuming compliance with that factor. On that basis, the consecutive sentences cannot be 
sustained. See Strunk. 846 P.2d at 1302 (court must consider need for rehabilitation); 
Smith. 909 P.2d at 245; see also Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(4) (court "shall" consider 
factors); Saunders. 1999 UT 59, [^61 (trial court's failure to comply with law constitutes 
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plain error). Herrera respectfully requests that this Court vacate the consecutive senten-
cing and remand the case to the trial court for resentencing in light of the factors. Utah R. 
Crim. P. 22(e) (court may correct sentence imposed in an illegal manner at any time). 
C. THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO MAKE A RECORD OF THE 
RELEVANT FACTORS HAS PREJUDICED HERRERA. 
Herrera was prejudiced in this matter by the trial judge's failure to take into 
consideration and to give proper weight to the facts in light of the statutory factors. If the 
trial judge had given proper weight to the facts in this case, Herrera likely would have 
received a more favorable sentence. Consideration of the facts in light of the statutory 
factors compels imposition of concurrent sentences for the second degree felony offenses, 
followed by imposition of the enhancements. Specifically, the gravity and circumstances 
of the crimes reflect a single act resulting in two charges; no one was physically injured; 
and Herrera had no intent of hurting the victim. Those facts support concurrent sentences. 
With regard to Herrera's criminal history, he has already been penalized for his 
past offenses, and continues to be penalized in this case with a felony conviction for 
possession by a restricted person. Beyond that, the history does not support consecutive 
sentences. Also, Herrera suffered from a dysfunctional upbringing and substance abuse 
problems. Those facts support his need for rehabilitation and concurrent sentencing. 
Finally, the agency preparing the presentence report expressed that Herrera needed 
rehabilitation and substance abuse intervention. The trial judge should have given those 
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facts proper consideration in the matter. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(4); Smith, 909 
P.2d at 245; Strunk, 846 P.2d at 1302; see also Saunders, 1999 UT 59, ^ [61 (failure to 
comply with law constitutes plain error). The record fails to support that the trial court 
gave those facts proper consideration in ordering consecutive sentences here. 
The sentencing judge here plainly erred. Her omissions make it unreasonable to 
assume that she considered the relevant factors. Where the basis for the trial court's 
ruling is ambiguous, the court's failure to enter findings necessitates remand. Robertson, 
932 P.2d at 1234 (findings are necessary to avoid ambiguity). Also, Herrera is entitled to 
have the matter corrected where consecutive sentencing was imposed in violation of the 
law. See Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e). 
In that regard, when a trial judge erroneously fails to enter findings, a remand may 
be sufficient to remedy the matter. Ramirez. 817 P.2d at 788. However, when findings 
are essential to sustain the judgment, further proceedings and resentencing are required. 
Id. Indeed, additional proceedings are particularly necessary when remand for specific 
findings would "tempt [the trial court] to reach a post hac rationalization" to justify its 
earlier decision. Id. at 789. 
That is the case here. The sentencing judge expressed contempt for Herrera when 
she sentenced him in this matter to consecutive terms. (See R. 80.) Merely remanding 
for the entry of findings would "tempt" the sentencing judge to justify her original 
assessment of the matter without proper consideration of the facts. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 
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789. This case should be remanded for further proceedings. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial judge's failure to make findings in accordance with the statute compels 
the entry of an order on appeal vacating the sentences and remanding the case for further 
proceedings. In that regard, the trial judge should be ordered to consider whether 
concurrent sentencing is more appropriate in this case. 
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT-SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OP UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
AARON TOMAS HERRERA, 
Defendant. 
Custody: Salt Lake County Jail 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
\ 
Case No: 991922679 FS : 
Judge: LESLIE A. LEWIS 
Date: January 5 , 2001 
So* \Hmwb ENTERED IN nUGOTRV 
PRESENT 
Clerk: chells 
Prosecutor: KOURIS, MARK S. 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s) : AH-CHING, VERNICE S 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: July 9, 1970 
Video 
Tape Number: 1 0 : 2 1 am 
DATE 
OF JUDGME»>TS | 0@ )>1 
CHARGES 
1 . ROBBERY - 2nd Degree Fe lony 
P l e a : G u i l t y - D i s p o s i t i o n : 1 1 / 1 6 / 2 0 0 0 { G u i l t y P l e a } 
4 . POSSESS DANGEROUS WEAPON U/INFL ALC/CS - 2nd Degree F e l o n y 
P l e a : G u i l t y - D i s p o s i t i o n : 1 1 / 1 6 / 2 0 0 0 { G u i l t y P l e a } 
SENTENCE PRISON 
1 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ROBBERY a 2nd Degree Felony, 
the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less 
than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. ! 
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSSESS DANGEROUS WEAPON 
U/INFL ALC/CS a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than fifteen 
years in the Utah State Prison. 
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately. 
Page 1 
Criminal Sentence @J 
^ * ^ * - ~ i ^ * ^ 
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Case 
Date: 
Nb 991922679 
Jan 05, 2001 x 
To the I SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
The two counts are to run consecutive to each other. 
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE 
The Court recommends the defedant be given credit for time served 
of 417 days. The Court recommends any money earned while in the 
Prison should first be paid to Mr Garcia, and then to the Insurance 
Agency. 
SENTENCE FINE 
Charge # 1 
Charge # 4 
Fine: $10000.00 
Suspended: $9750.00 
Surcharge: $212.50 
Due: $462.50 
Fine: $10000.00 
Suspended: $10000.00 
Surcharge: $ Total Fine: $20000.00 
Total Suspended: $19750.00 
Total Surcharge: $212.50 
Total Principal Due: $462.50 
Plus Interest 
Pacre 2 n n r - n n 
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! 
i 
Case No: 991922679 
Date: Jan 05, 2001 
SENTENCE TRUST 
The defendant is to pay the following: 
Restitution: Amount: $500.00 Plus Interest 
Pay in behalf of: KEITH GARCIA 
Restitution: Amount: $10732.00 
Pay in behalf of: 1485 E 3900 SOUTH STATE FARM INSURANCE 
Attorney Fees: Amount: $350.00 
Pay in behalf of: LEGAL DEFENDARS ASSOCIATION 
SENTENCE TRUST NOTE 
The restitution is to be jointly and severally paid with the 2 
co-defendants. 
The Court orders the defendant is sentenced on the f-2 robbery with 
the gun enhancement 6-15 years in the Prison and on the f-2 
possession of a dangerous weapon with the group enhancement to 1-15 
years and 1-5 years. To run consecutive to each other.The 
presentence report has inaccuarcies. The Court will allow an 
addendum to be prepared. Ms Ah-ching and Mr Kouris will review and 
Vane* ^ flskch\ 
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76-3-401. Concurrent or consecutive sentences — Limita-
tions — Definition. 
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more 
than one felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences 
for the offenses. Sentences for state offenses shall run concurrently unless the 
court states in the sentence that they shall run consecutively. 
(2) The court shall order that sentences for state offenses run consecutively 
if the later offense is committed while the defendant is imprisoned or on parole 
unless the court jfinds and states on the record that consecutive sentencing 
would be inappropriate. 
(3) If an order of commitment does not clearly state whether the sentences 
shall run consecutively or concurrently, and the Board of Pardons and Parole 
has reason to believe that the later offense occurred while the person was 
imprisoned or on parole for the earlier offense, the board shall request 
clarification from the court. Upon receipt of the request, the court shall enter 
an amended order of commitment stating whether the sentences are to run 
consecutively or concurrently. 
(4) A court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses and 
the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant in determining 
whether to impose consecutive sentences. 
(5) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out of a 
single criminal episode as defined in Section 76-1-401. 
(6) (a) If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate maximum of 
all sentences imposed may not exceed 30 years imprisonment, except as 
provided under Subsection (6)(b). 
(b) The limitation under Subsection (6)(a) does not apply if: 
(i) an offense for which the defendant is sentenced authorizes the 
death penalty or a maximum sentence of life imprisonment; or 
(ii) the defendant is convicted of an additional offense based on 
conduct which occurs after his initial sentence or sentences are 
imposed. 
(7) The limitation in Subsection (6)(a) applies if a defendant: 
(a) is sentenced at the same time for more than one offense; 
(b) is sentenced at different times for one or more offenses, all of which 
were committed prior to imposition of the defendant's initial sentence; or 
(c) has already been sentenced by a court of this state other than the 
present sentencing court or by a court of another state or federal 
jurisdiction, and the conduct giving rise to the present offense did not 
occur after his initial sentencing by any other court. 
(8) When the limitation of Subsection (6)(a) applies, determining the effect 
of consecutive sentences and the manner in which they shall be served, the 
Board of Pardons and Parole shall treat the defendant as though he has been 
committed for a single term that shall consist of the aggregate of the validly 
imposed prison terms as follows: 
(a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-year limitation, the 
maximum sentence is considered to be 30 years; and 
(b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, the minimum 
term, if any, constitutes the aggregate of the validly imposed minimum 
terms. 
(9) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to run concur-
rently with the other or with a sentence presently being served, the lesser 
sentence shall merge into the greater and the greater shall be the term to be 
served. If the sentences are equal and concurrent, they shall merge into one 
sentence with the most recent conviction constituting the time to be served. 
(10) This section may not be construed to restrict the number or length of 
individual consecutive sentences that may be imposed or to affect the validity 
of any sentence so imposed, but only to limit the length of sentences actually 
served under the commitments. 
(11) This section may not be construed to limit the authority of a court to 
impose consecutive sentences in misdemeanor cases. 
(12) As used in this section, "imprisoned" means sentenced and committed 
to a secure correctional facility as defined in Section 64-13-1, the sentence has 
not been terminated or voided, and the person is not on parole, regardless of 
where the person is located. 
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UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Rule 22. Sentence, judgment and commitment. 
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no contest, the 
court shall set a time for imposing sentence which shall be not less than two 
nor more than 45 days after the verdict or plea, unless the court, with the 
concurrence of the defendant, otherwise orders. Pending sentence, the court 
may commit the defendant or may continue or alter bail or recognizance. 
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportu-
nity to make a statement and to present any information in mitigation of 
punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence should not be imposed. 
The prosecuting attorney shall also be given an opportunity to present any 
information material to the imposition of sentence. 
(b) On the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in defendant's 
absence, defendant may likewise be sentenced in defendants absence. If a 
defendant fails to appear for sentence, a warrant for defendant's arrest may be 
issued by the court. 
(c) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall 
impose sentence and shall enter a judgment of conviction which shall include 
the plea or the verdict, if any, and the sentence. Following imposition of 
sentence, the court shall advise the defendant of defendant's right to appeal 
and the time within which any appeal shall be filed. 
(d) When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, the court shall issue its 
commitment setting forth the sentence. The officer delivering the defendant to 
the jail or prison shall deliver a true copy of the commitment to the jail or 
prison and shall make the officer's return on the commitment and file it with 
the court. 
(e) The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an 
illegal manner, at any time. 
(f) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty and mentally ill, the court shall impose 
v sentence in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 16a, Utah Code. If the court 
retains jurisdiction over a mentally ill offender committed to the Department 
of Human Services as provided by Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-202(l)(b), the court 
shall so specify in the sentencing order. 
(Amended effective January 1,1995; January 1, 1996.) 
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and having said that, unless Mr. Herrera has something further 
to say, we would submit. 
THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Herrera? 
THE DEFENDANT: I said sorry. 
THE COURT: Yeah, you've said sorry. 
THE DEFENDANT: I've been wanting to say that for a 
long time. Whatever sentence you hand down to me, I'm sure I 
deserve. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
It will be the order of the Court in connection with 
the defendant's conviction for robbery a second degree felony, 
that he be sentenced to the indeterminate term of one to 15 
years and with the enhancement I believe it makes it six to 15 
years. That is the sentence on that charge. 
In connection with the possession of a dangerous 
weapon, also a second degree felony with a gang enhancement, I 
believe, it's one to 15 that he's sentenced to plus an 
additional one to five. This are to run consecutive to one 
another. The Court will recommend that he be given full credit 
for the actual time he has served that he's entitled to by law 
and that's 417 days as I understand it. Additionally, he's to 
pay full restitution in the amount of $11,232. He's to pay a 
fine in the amount of $250 plus an 85 percent surcharge, 
keeping that low because of the high amount of restitution and 
he's to pay a recoupment fee in the amount of $350 and as I 
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said, these are consecutive. 
I've given you as much as I can give you Mr. Herrera 
and it wasn't a tough choice. Your choices have left me with 
no choice and when I look at Mr. Garcia and I look at you, and 
I listen to what you have to say about your past actions, your 
present actions, I see no trace of remorse. I see no 
acknowledgment of responsibility and in the letter there are 
pat phrases about I'm so sorry, I hope this is something you 
can get over. I have no sense that you have any responsibility 
in your own mind for this and I think you are a very dangerous 
individual. 
As Mr. Kouris pointed out, many things go into a 
Judge's consideration, many considerations are part of 
sentencing. One is protection of the community. That is the 
principle reason for the sentence. The other is to deter, or 
one of the others, is to deter further conduct of this type and 
then there's simply punishment. You're saying you're sorry is 
completely meaningless because you cannot give back to Mr. 
Garcia what you took away. 
THE DEFENDANT: I know I can't. 
THE COURT: I don't think you do know but in any 
event the bottom line is you have had a hard life. There's no 
doubt about it but a lot of people who have a hard life, even 
those who turn to crime, stand before me and say I've done 
everything they've said I've done. You didn't say that. You 
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have an excuse for everything you've ever done in your life and 
this is inexcusable. Clarence Darrow once said, I abhor the 
crime not the criminal and in this case these crimes are so 
abhorrent that you leave me with no choice on the sentence and 
it's forthwith. 
MR. KOURIS: Your Honor, if I may ask one request and 
that is could the restitution be structured in such a way that 
whatever he makes while working in the prison go first to the 
Garcia family and then go to the insurance company afterwards 
to pay for the car? 
THE COURT: Yeah. That will be the order. 
MS. AH CHING: The other thing also in regard to the 
restitution, Judge, there are two co-defendants and would ask 
that the Court order joint -
THE COURT: Joint (inaudible). Yeah. That's 
appropriate and that will be part of the order as well. 
MS. AH CHING: And then lastly Judge, not that I 
don't trust AP&P will make the changes, but would it be okay if 
I did an order -
THE COURT: Absolutely. 
MS. AH CHING: - have the Court sign it and then have 
the -
THE COURT: I think that would be a very good idea 
and I'd be happy to sign it after Mr. Kouris and you have put 
it together. 
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MS. AH CHING: Thank you Judge. That's all I have. 
THE COURT: You want your pictures back? 
MR. KOURIS: Do you want them? 
THE COURT: Absolutely not. Hate them. 
Now, we'Nre going to take a ten minute break unless 
there's something that is like a two second deal. 
(Whereupon the sentencing was concluded.) 
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